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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Aggravated Assault by a 
Prisoner, a felony of the Second Degree. Jurisdiction vests in this Court 
pursuant to Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 78-2A-3 Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Was the introduction of a surprise witness prejudicial to 
Defendant and the preparation and strategy of his case? The standard of 
review for a trial Court's ruling on the admissabi1ity of evidence is "abuse 
of discretion;" whether the trial court's decision was beyond the limits of 
reasonab i iity. State v. Archuleta, 850 P2d 1232 (Utah 1993j. Such prejudice 
must be to a level of the likelihood of a different result. State__y_._Jinight, 
734 P2d 913 (Utah 1993). 
Was the show of force in the courtroom during closing arguments 
prejudicial to the jury's perception of the Defendant? The standard of review 
is lack of due process. Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. State v. Mitchell, 824 P2d 469 (Utah App. 1991). 
Was the iiiipi upei presence of a tnird party iaw enrofceineut ui i i^ ei 
in the jury room during the jury's deliberations prejudicial to an impartial 
verdict? The standard of review is lack of due process. State v. Young, 
Supra. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Rule 16(a)(g), Utah Rules Criminal Procedure 
Rule 17(e) Utah Rules Criminal Procedure 
Rule 26 Utah Rules Criminal Procedure 
Set forth verbatim in Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant Anthony Sterling was charged by Information with 
Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner in violation of Section 76-5-103,5(1), Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 as amended in the Seventh District Court in and for San 
Juan County, State of Utah, for acts allegedly occurring on September 29, 
1992, Defendant was accused of assaulting a iailer with a men wn'nqer. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
After Preliminary Hearing on February 4, 1993, Defendant 
waived all formal bind over procedures and entered a plea of not guilty in the 
Upper Division. After a change of Counsel, Defendant filed a Request for 
Discovery on May 6, 1993, properly served on the prosecutor by mail. (R-25-
26 j . As part ot discovery, Defendant requested in paragraph 9 
The names and addresses of all the witnesses the 
prosecutor proposes to call at the time cf trial not 
supplied in response to the above requests (R-27). 
On May 17, 1993 the San Juan County Attorney responded to the 
Discovery Request and filed a Certificate of Service (R-31). 
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Trial by jury was conducted before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, 
Judge over two days August 20 and 23, 1993. 
On the first day of trial the State called as a witness Rex Dana, 
an investigator for the Department of Corrections (Trial Transcript Vol. II, 
p. 122). The testimony was a surprise to the Defendant as Mr. Dana's name had 
not been disclosed. A timely objection was made to the introduction of Mr. 
Dana's testimony (Transcript Vol II, pp 119-121.) See also transcript Vol. II 
pp 202-204 and list of prosecution subpoenaed witnesses R-36-51. 
During closing arguments, unbeknownst to counsel or the Court a 
law enforcement officer sat behind the Defendant brandishing a weapon by 
rubbing the butt end of his gun in an unsnapped holster. Such actions were 
within the view of the jury and were such that Defendant felt threatened 
(Transcript Vol. IV pp 392-96). Defendant asked for a mistrial, but the Court 
made a determination that he had not requested the same (Transcript Vol. IV, p 
396). The withdrawal of that Motion is not explicit in the record. 
Subsequent to the discussion of the armed bailiff, the Court 
advised Defendant and his Counsel that a bailiff had entered into the jury 
room during part of their deliberations (Transcript Vol. IV, 396-99). The 
person involved was questioned about his interaction with the jurors. 
Although the bailiff attempted to downplay his interaction with the jurors and 
stated "the evidence was there, that they could-." (Transcript Vol. IV, p 
398). 
3 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court. 
Defendant was found guilty by the jury on August 23, 1993. 
He was sentenced to a term of not less than one nor more than fifteen years at 
the Utah State Prison. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It was reversible error for the Court not to exclude the 
testimony of an undisclosed witness. If such evidence were excluded, there is 
a substantial likelihood of a result more favorable to Defendant. The show of 
force by an armed officer, in this instance the victim of Defendant's alleged 
assault, during closing argument denies Defendant due process and an impartial 
jurv. The oresence of a law-enforcement officer in the jury room during 
deliberations over an assault on a law enforcement officer puts undue pressure 
on the jurors, denying Defendant his right to an impartial jury. 
I. ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY OF SURPRISE WITNESS 
At the time of the alleged assault, Defendant was an inmate 
at the San Juan County jail on other charges. One day, while in his cell 
block but outside his "house," Defendant was ordered by a corrections officer 
to return to his cell. Defendant questioned the officer's motives for such an 
order. After an exchange between different officers from the control room and 
Defendant's continued refusal to obey instructions during the standoff, 
officers rushed into the cellblock and subdued Defendant. 
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Throughout the course of the trial, Defendant's position and 
the thrust of most cross-examination was that although Defendant admitted he 
refused to return to his cell after being ordered, and while he admitted 
having the mop wringer and other items in his possession, he denied that he 
ever threatened any officer with them or that he ever had any intent to harm 
anyone. Thus cross examination focused on the statements made by Defendant 
whether such statements were spontaneous or in response to input from the 
officers who had gathered, and the location of the officers as inside or 
outside of the cell block while Defendant made statements or gestures. 
Indeed, the testimony was that during most of the confrontation the officers 
communicated with Mr. Sterling via intercom (eg transcript Vol I, p 75) from a 
secure location. 
The impression given to the jury from those witnesses made 
known to Defendant prior to trial was that although Defendant refused to obey 
orders and was perhaps even recalcitrant, was still that he did not threaten 
any officers nor was in any position to due to the cell block, as well as the 
control room, being sealed. 
Perhaps realizing its dilemma, that although the jury would 
not find Defendant a likable person neither would they find him guilty of 
assault, the State introduced, over objection, the testimony of Rex Dana. 
(Transcript Vol II, pp 119-140). Mr. Dana was an investigator for the 
Department of Corrections on the date of the incident and interviewed Mr. 
5 
Sterling the day after (Transcript Vol. II, pp 122-24). Mr. Dana prepared a 
report from his investigation and forwarded the same to the San Juan County 
Sheriff's Office, the agency under the direct control of the prosecutor in 
this case. (Transcript Vol. II, pp 129-30). Mr Dana did not advise Defendant 
of his Miranda rights prior to interviewing him (Transcript Vol. II, p 127). 
Neither Mr. Dana's name nor report was furnished to the Defendant until the 
day before trial. (Transcript Vol. II, pp 119-122). 
Defendant claims prejudice in lack of time to adequately 
prepare for the testimony of Mr. Dana and adjust his strategy accordingly. 
In a similar situation the Utah Supreme Court found the 
trial court had correctly found the State had violated its duty to disclose 
under Rule 16(a). State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1993). In that 
case the surprise testimony was only revealed to the prosecution the night 
before the trial testimony. Regardless, the court found a violation of the 
continuous duty of the prosecutor to provide discovery material to the 
Defendant on request, whether through Court order or voluntary. Unlike 
Archuleta the information here was known to the State for some time before 
trial, at lease constructively. The witness testified that his reports had 
been forwarded to an agency under the prosecutor's control. It is the 
prosecutor's duty to ensure that such agencies forward such materials to him. 
Their failure to so do should not prejudice Defendant. 
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Although the Archuleta decision did not reverse, the Supreme 
Court did find in State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), that like 
circumstances required setting aside a conviction. 
In Knight a State investigator took statements from two 
witnesses before trial that had lain in a file thereafter (at 915). The 
Supreme Court articulated two requirements that the prosecution must meet in 
responding to a discovery request. First, all material must be produced or 
identified. Second, the response must continue on an ongoing basis. 
The result of an incomplete response are noted in Archuleta 
at 917: 
"The Government notes that an incomplete response to a 
specific request not only deprives the defense of 
certain evidence, but has the effect of representing 
to the defense that the evidence does not exist. In 
reliance on this misleading representation, the 
defense might abandon lines of independent 
investigation, defenses, or trial strategies that it 
otherwise would have pursued. 
We agree that the prosecutor's failure to 
respond fully to a ...request may impair the adversary 
process in this manner. Id. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3384 
(citation omitted)." 
Citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) 
The purpose behind continuous discovery was stated as to 
make criminal discovery fair. The Archuleta Court cited the previous case of 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985): 
To meet basic standards of fairness and to insure that 
a trial is a real quest for truth and not simply a 
contest between the parties to win, a defendant's 
request for information which has been voluntarily 
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complied with, or a court order of discovery must be 
deemed to be a continuing request. And even though 
there is no court-ordered disclosure, a prosecutor's 
failure to disclose newly discovered inculpatory 
information which falls with[in] the gambit of Section 
77-35-16(a), after the prosecution has made a 
voluntary disclosure of evidence might so mislead 
defendant as to cause prejudicial error. Id. at 662. 
As in Knight, the non-disclosed material is inculpatory. 
"It seems appropriate in such instances to place the burden on the State to 
persuade the Court that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defense." 
Id, at 921. 
Although the State may argue that reversal is too harsh for 
what admittedly is probably an oversight, there were other remedies available 
that would have avoided the need for such a remedy at this stage. "The tria1 
count has ample power to obviate any prejudice resulting from a breach of the 
criminal discovery rules and may fashion a remedy as it sees fit so long as 
the substantial rights of the Defendant are not violated." Archuleta, supra 
at 1243, citing Knight and Carter. 
In the instant case there is an additional compelling reason 
to reverse due to the failure to disclose Dana's testimony. Prior knowledge 
of the statements made without Miranda would likely have led to a suppression 
hearing to totally exclude investigator Dana or his reports. 
II. USE OF FORCE IN THE COURTROOM 
"It is well established that "[a] principal ingredient of 
due process is that every criminal defendant is entitled to a fair and 
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impartial trial." Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 104. A criminal defendant's right to 
a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1692, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 
(1976). Further, "[t]he presumption of innocence, although not articulated in 
the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of 
criminal justice." State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah App 1991). 
Defendant contends that the presence of the law enforcement 
officer/"victim" with a weapon adversely affected his right to a fair trial. 
The decision whether to restrain the accused rests in the 
trial judge, Mitchel1, 473. In this case however, the decision was taken from 
the judge by the impromptu appearance of the officer. The prejudice to 
Defendant is attenuated by the fact that the officer making the show of arms 
was the alleged victim, reinforcing to the jury that the accused is a 
dangerous person who must be controlled, either through weapons or themselves. 
Even if this Court finds there is no adequate showing of the existence of a 
gun, the mere presence of the extra security seated behind Defendant is enough 
to garner this Court's concern. See e.g. State__v^ _..Gardner? 789 P2d 273, 281 
(Utah 1989). 
Other Courts have found that the use of additional security 
measures makes it hard for the jury to fairly or impartially weigh the 
evidence before it. Dickson v. State, 822 P.2d 1122 (Nevada 1992), People y^ 
Duram, 16 Cal 3d 282, 1257 Cal. Rptr 618, 625, 545 P.2d 1322, 1329 (1976), 
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cited in Gardner. "To restrain a Defendant during trial without substantial 
justification is a ground for reversal." State v. Glick, 697 P.2d 1002, 1003 
(Or. App 1985). See also State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993). 
III. IMPROPER COMMUNICATION BY BAILIFF WITH JURORS DURING 
DELIBERATIONS 
Pursuant to Rule 17(e) Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
after the jury has begun its deliberations the officer having them under his 
charge shall not allow any communication to be made to them, or make any 
himself, "It is axiomatic that a Defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial 
trial based on the evidence presented to the jury, without the jury being 
influenced by information from outside sources." State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 
1254, ' ^ c (»Jt?.h ^?83)} citing Sheppard v. ^axwcl 1, :?•; -J.S. 332. 
Utah law places the burden on the prosecution to show that 
contact between court personnel and jurors did not influence the jurors. 
A rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises from any 
unauthorized contact during a trial between witnesses, 
attorneys or court personnel and jurors which goes 
beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and brief 
contact ....[w]hen the contact is more than 
incidental, the burden is on the prosecution to prove 
that the unauthorized contact did not influence the 
juror. Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224, 225 
citing State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985). 
Any such contact denies the Defendant his right to trial by 
a fair and impartial jury in violation of Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. State v Durand, 569 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1977), cited in 
Carlson, at 225. In Durand, some jurors went into the sheriff's office for 
10 
coffee and conversation on two occasions. On one occasion witnesses were 
present. While the Supreme Court did not reverse in Durand, it did disapprove 
of jurors going into the sheriff's office or in engaging in even casual 
conversation with witnesses. 
Again, in the instant case the prejudicial factor is 
heightened due to the connection between the alleged victim and the intruder 
in the jury room. Jurors cannot help but be deterred in their deliberations 
over the actions by or against a law enforcement officer when a law 
enforcement officer from the same agency is present with them. 
In one instance a sister jurisdiction held that on intrusion 
by the bailiff for as little as three minutes was sufficient for reversal. 
Foreman v. State, 370 P.2d 34 (Oklahoma 1962). The Foreman Court cites 
several cases where conduct as innocuous as taking water into the jurors was 
reversible error, People v Chambers, 279 Mich. 73, 271 N.W. 556. "It is not 
what the officer may have said or done any more than his mere presence with 
the jury that is or may be prejudicial to the Defendant and tend to cast 
suspicion upon the otherwise orderly administration of justice" People v., 
Knapp 42 Mich. 267, 3 N.W. 927. See also State v. Christensen, 17 Wash App 
922, 567 P.2d 654 (1977) and 35 ALR 4th 890. 
In the instant case the possibility of prejudice is 
aggravated by factors in addition to the bailiff/victim identity. It appears 
from the record that the bailiff gave the jurors some direction. This 
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direction, "The evidence was there, that they could" (Transcript Vol, IV P 
398, can be construed to mean that sufficient evidence was there that the jury 
could convict. That something was amiss in the bai1 iff/juror contact is 
indicated by the contray statements made by the bailiff. Cf, statement at p. 
397 "I didn't speak with them" with the prior statements. Further undue 
influence would have been created by the uncertainty of the juror as to 
whether their sanctum could be invaded at any time during their discussion of 
the Law enforcement officers. At any rate, the State has not carried its 
burden of disproving prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
The State's charge of aggravated assault by an individual in a 
locked cellblock against individuals in a locked control room is inherently 
weak. Without the testimony of a surprise witness of Defendant's intent to 
harm, as well as the undue influence of an armed security officer during 
closing arguments and the intrusion of a fellow law-enforcement officer in the 
jury room, there was a substantial likelihood of a different result. 
Defendant's conviction should be reversed. 
DATED this 24th day of January, 1994. 
\AS sJJ** A y^c 
William L. Schultz \ 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges o9r immunities of citizens of the United States; not 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; not deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
RULE 16. DISCOVERY 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the 
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) revelant written or recorded statements of the defendant or 
codefendants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to nbegate the 
guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant,m or mitigate the 
degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cuase shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable 
following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. 
The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(g) If at any time during the course of theproceedings it brought to 
the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, 
the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
RULE 17 
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept 
together in some covenient place under charge of an officer until they agree 
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
Except by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall 
not allow any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to 
ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the 
verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their 
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
CRAIG C, HALLS #1317 
San Juan County Attorney 
P. 0, Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Phone 587*2128 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAW COUNTY, STATB OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, * FINDINGS, JUDGMENT 
vs. AND COMMITMENT 
ANTHONY STERLING, * Criminal No* 9217-222 
Defendant(s). * 
THIS MATTER came before the Court for Sentencing on the 23rd 
day of August, 1993, before the above entitled Court, Craig C* 
Halls, San Juan County Attorney, attorney for State of Utah, and 
Defendant appearing in person and with his attorney, William L. 
Schultz. 
The Defendant agreeing to wave the minimum 2-day time period 
for sentencing, Defendant was found guilty by jury of Aggravated 
Assault by a Prisoner, a Second Degree Felony* 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, 
that the Defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison to serve 
a term not of not less than cue (1) year nor more than 15 years. 
Defendant is to pay restitution to £an Juan County in the sum of 
$600•00 as was determined in the disciplinary hearing by the 
Corrections Department* 
AUQ 23 93 
fEVEKTH DISTRICT CGITJ 
STATE CFUTM! 
Sheriff of San Juan County is directed to take him into 
custody and deliver him forthwith to the warden of the Utah State 
Prison. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the original of this Judgment and 
Commitment shall be attested to by the Clerk of the Court and that 
a certified copy hereof be delivered to said Sheriff or other 
qualified officer and that copy serve as the Commitment of the 
Defendant and of the Warrant for the Sheriff in taking into 
custody, detainingf and delivering said Defendant* 
DATED: August 23, 1993 
LLL 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
ATTEST: 
*^&?^ 
Clerk of the Court 
? t 
